Lars Ehlers
- Professeur titulaire
-
Faculté des arts et des sciences - Département de sciences économiques
Pavillon Lionel-Groulx office C6026
Web : Google Scholar
Web : Autre site web
Affiliations
- Membre – CIREQ — Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative
Education Programs
- Economics and Politics Fundamental and Applied Sciences
- Economics and Politics Fundamental and Applied Sciences
- Economics and Politics
- Economics and Politics
- Economics and Politics
- Economics and Politics
Courses
- ECN3565 Économie industrielle avancée
- ECN4040 Microéconomie honor
- ECN7040 Microéconomie A
- ECN70952 Séminaire de doctorat 2
Areas of Expertise
Lars Ehlers joined the Université de Montréal in 2001. He earned his PhD in Economics at the University of Maastricht in 2001, after graduating in Mathematics from the University of Aachen, in 1997.
He is an elected member of the Council of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare and a member of the Board of the Society for Economic Design.
In the 2003 SSHRC Standard Research Grants competition, his research proposal was ranked first in Canada. In 2012, the Society for Social Choice and Welfare awarded him the 6th Social Choice and Welfare Prize. He is the organizer of the Microeconomic Theory Group at CIREQ.
At present, his research deals with the manipulation of matching mechanisms on labour markets, the assignment of indivisible objects and externalities in cooperative environments.
Student supervision Expand all Collapse all
Research projects Expand all Collapse all
Public School Choice and Refugee Assignment: (Dynamic) Minimal Instability for Non-Unit Capacities and for Lotteries and Weak Priorities Projet de recherche au Canada / 2023 - 2029
Subvention de déphasage_Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ) Projet de recherche au Canada / 2020 - 2023
Maximizing the Number of Matches in Market Design: Public Housing, Refugees and School Choice Projet de recherche au Canada / 2017 - 2023
Recherches sur les fondations des mécanismes d'allocation des ressources Projet de recherche au Canada / 2016 - 2021
CENTRE INTERUNIVERSITAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE (CIREQ) Projet de recherche au Canada / 2014 - 2021
FLEXIBLE SCHOOL CHOICE Projet de recherche au Canada / 2012 - 2018
RECHERCHE SUR LES FONDATIONS DES MÉCANISMES SOUS INCERTITUDE NON PROBABILISÉE ET EFFECTIVITÉ DES COALITIONS DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS DIVERSES Projet de recherche au Canada / 2012 - 2017
CENTRE INTERUNIVERSITAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE (CIREQ) Projet de recherche au Canada / 2008 - 2015
BREAKING TIES IN SCHOOL CHOICE : WALK ZONES VERSUS SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS Projet de recherche au Canada / 2009 - 2011
Publications Expand all Collapse all
- " Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods ", Journal of Economic Theory 151, 2014, 64-87.
- " Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability ", Theoretical Economics 9, 2014, 64-87 (avec T. Andersson et L.-G. Svensson).
- " Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ", Mathematics of Operations Research 39, 2014, 949-966 (avec B. Klaus).
- " School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds ", Journal of Economic Theory 154, 2014, 648-683 (avec I.E. Hafalir, M.B. Yenmez et M.A. Yilidrim).
- " Matching Markets under (In)complete Information ", Journal of Economic Theory 157, 2015, 295-317 (avec J. Massó).
- " Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics ", Games and Economic Behavior 97, 2016, 128-146 (avec B. Klaus).
- " Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle ", Economic Journal 126, 2016, 884-906 (avec S. Ambec).
- " Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach ", Journal of Economic Theory 165, 2016, 643-671 (avec T. Andersson et L.-G. Svensson).
- “Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited,” Journal of Economic Theory 176 (2018): 393—407.
- “Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking in Matching with Priorities,” avec A. Westkamp, Theoretical Economics 13 (2018): 1009—1042.
- “Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Mechanisms,” avec D. Majumdar, D. Mishra et A. Sen, Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (2020): 31—41.
- “Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings,” avec T. Andersson, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 122 (2020): 937—965.
- “(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice,” avec T. Morrill,Review of Economic Studies 87 (2020): 1837—1875.
- “Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets,” avec T. Andersson, Á. Cseh and A. Erlanson, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (2021): 338—373.
- “Minimally Unstable Pareto Improvement over the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism,” avec B. Doğan, Theoretical Economics 16 (2021): 1249—1279.
- “An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities,” avec T. Andersson, International Journal of Economic Theory 18 (2022): 50—60 (Special Issue in honor of W. Thomson).
- “Robust Minimal Instability of the Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism,” avec B. Doğan, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14 (2022): 556—582.
- “Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses,” avec T. Andersson, L.-G. Svensson, et R. Tierney, Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2022): 3110—3128.
- “Normative Properties for Object Allocation Problems: Characterizations and Trade-offs,” with B. Klaus, Chapter 10 in “Online and Matching-Based Market Design” (eds. F. Echenique, N. Immorlica et V.V. Vazirani), Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
- “Three Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences: Preferences: Replacement Principle,” Review of Economic Design 26 (2022): 367—384 (Special Issue in honor of S. Koray).
- " School Choice with Control " (http//cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/13-2010-cah.pdf) ", 2010
- " Externalities and the Nucleolus ", 2017 (avec M. Álvarez-Munos).
- “Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance,” avec J. Massó, May 2018. Lien: https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/04-2018-cah.pdf
- “Dynamic Refugee Matching,” avec T. Andersson et A. Martinello, October 2018. https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/22-2018-cah.pdf
- “Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices,” avec T. Andersson et L.-G. Svensson, December 2020.Lien: https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/01-2021-cah.pdf
- “Strategy-Proof and Envyfree Random Assignment,” avec C. Basteck, December 2020. Lien: https://cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/02-2021-cah.pdf
- “Student-Optimal Interdistrict School Choice: District-Based versus School-Based Admissions,” November 2022). https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/27761
- "On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment" avec C. Basteck, April 2023 https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/27983
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“ Respecting Improvement in Markets with Indivisible Goods” Septembre 2023 https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/28758/RI2023.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
“ Respecting Improvement in Markets with Indivisible Goods” Septembre 2023 https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/28758/RI2023.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
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